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Abstract. This article challenges the widespread and influential claim - made by 
many liberals and non-liberals - that cultural membership is a prerequisite of 
individual autonomy. It argues that liberals like Joseph Raz and Will Kymlicka, 
who ground autonomy in culture, underestimate the complex and internally 
diverse nature of the self, and the extent to which individual agents will often be 
shaped by many different attachments and memberships at once. In 
'selectively elevating' one of these memberships (culture) as the most 
important to one's autonomy or identity, culturalist liberals present a skewed 
and simplistic account of individual autonomy and, hence, of liberalism. 
Instead, autonomy should be seen as arising not out of any particular 
membership or attachment, but out of the interaction between those different 
memberships which shape the individual's understanding of themselves and 
the world in which they live. This alternative account holds important 
implications for liberal theory, particularly the tensions between 'political' and 
'comprehensive' liberals about the scope of liberal principles and the nature of 
public reasoning about justice. 
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It has become increasingly common in the literature on liberalism and multiculturalism to 
argue that personal autonomy is dependent upon membership of a particular culture. Joseph 
Raz, for example, has argued that “individual freedom and well-being [depends on] 
unimpeded membership in a respected and prosperous cultural group” (Raz, 1994: 178), and 
that only “through being socialized in a culture can one tap the options which give life a 
meaning.” (Raz, 1994: 177). Avishai Margalit has argued that cultural “forms of life  . . . are 
frames that present the individual with a range of choices among options, giving meaning to 
the person’s choice, and thus forming his or her identity.” (Margalit, 1997: 82). And Will 
Kymlicka has argued that liberalism “should be concerned with the fate of cultural structures” 
because it is only though being a member of a culture that “people can become aware, in a 
vivid way, of the options available to them and intelligently examine their value.” (Kymlicka, 
1989: 165). Common to these and other culturalist thinkers, then, are a set of claims about 
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the nature of freedom and the conditions under which it might be exercised. Insofar as 
liberalism is committed to defending the ability of individuals to live lives in the pursuit of ends 
that they themselves have endorsed as worthwhile, they argue, it should also attach value to 
cultural membership because it is one’s embeddedness in a cultural community which 
provides the background conditions necessary for autonomous choice to take place. One’s 
culture provides the range of options from which one can choose when deciding what to do 
with one’s life, and the historical and linguistic tools with which to evaluate the relative worth 
of these options (Kymlicka, 1989: 162 – 181; Raz, 1994). 
 
This culturalist approach fulfils two important functions: one political and the other 
philosophical. Firstly, it provides a liberal response to the very real changes in the ethnic, 
cultural, and religious composition of many liberal democratic states. It reveals more clearly 
the demands of liberal toleration in an era of increased migration, globalisation and social 
change and presents a powerful justification for taking the identity claims of individual citizens 
seriously. Secondly, it represents a direct response to those communitarian critics who worry 
that liberalism leads to atomism and a breakdown of community. Critics like Michael Sandel 
and Alasdair MacIntyre have argued that liberalism is necessarily rooted in a mistaken 
conception of the self (as ‘unencumbered’ of its ends and attachments) and agency (as a 
purely voluntarist process) (Sandel, 1982; MacIntyre 1996). Culturalists suggest that these 
criticisms are mistaken because the concepts of individuality and agency at the heart of 
liberalism presuppose that persons are, in fact, ‘encumbered’ by the ends and ideals afforded 
to them by their cultural community. Liberals who foreground culture have suggested that 
liberalism does not (or should not) subscribe to a conception of agency which is purely 
voluntarist or cognitivist, but rather one which incorporates both the process of ‘discovering’ 
the particular attachments one shares, and deciding what one should do and what one 
believes to be valuable on the basis of these discoveries.   
 
In this article I explore (and ultimately reject) the culturalist approach. I do so by challenging 
some of the claims advanced by Will Kymlicka about the link between culture and autonomy. 
In doing so, I touch upon the work of other culturallist thinkers, such as Joseph Raz. Both Raz 
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and Kymlicka converge on two fundamental claims: (a) that liberalism is rightfully understood 
as a comprehensive doctrine, rooted in the value of individual autonomy, and (b) that cultural 
membership is a necessary condition for this autonomy. In addition to sharing a commitment 
to culture, therefore, they also share a rejection of the kind of ‘political liberalism’ advanced by 
liberals like John Rawls and Charles Larmore (Rawls, 1993; Larmore, 1996). Raz’s 
perfectionism stands opposed to Rawlsian political liberalism and its requirements of 
‘epistemic restraint’, rooting itself instead in thicker ethical notions such as well-being and 
autonomy (Raz, 1986). Similarly, Kymlicka has argued against adopting the Rawlsian 
position, as, like Raz, he believes that the model of public reasoning at its heart is too 
demanding of citizens and misunderstands the character of autonomy and cultural 
membership. The problem with Rawls’ political liberalism, he says, is that it assumes people 
can be “communitarians in private life and liberals in public life. But,” he asks, “is this a 
coherent position?” (Kymlicka, 1995: 160).  
 
I argue that it is. Or, at least, I suggest that it is more coherent than Kymlicka believes. My 
aim is two-fold. Firstly, in section 1, I seek to show that the culturalist approach to 
understanding individual autonomy is rooted in a simplistic account of the self and agency, 
and hence, should be rejected as a basis for liberal theorising about justice. I therefore aim to 
show that claim ‘a’, above, is correct, but that claim ‘b’ is not. Secondly, in section 2, I argue 
that once reject the normative strategy underlying culturalism it is possible to resolve some of 
the tensions between political liberals and comprehensive liberals about the scope and 
content of liberalism.  
 
1.  Liberalism and Culture. 
 
Culturalists seek to disprove the communitarian claim that liberalism presupposes an 
unencumbered self which chooses the life it leads from “a purely universal and abstract point 
of view that is totally detached from all social particularity.” (MacIntyre, 1981: 32). They do so 
by suggesting that a self unencumbered in this way would not be capable of autonomy 
because autonomy is a process of evaluating the relative worth of one’s encumbered 
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attachments. Agency is necessarily a process both of discovering the roles one occupies 
(andtheir attendant obligations) and evaluating their relative worth (Kymlicka, 1989; Kymlicka, 
1997; Raz, 1986; Raz, 1994; Tamir, 1993; see also Moon, 1993).  
 
Let us assume that this argument holds. What does it tell us about liberalism and autonomy? 
Kymlicka believes that having shown that liberal autonomy presupposes a cognitivist element 
(i.e. that autonomy presupposes some social or community based framework within which 
one can frame and revise one’s ideas about the good life), he is able to argue for the 
importance of culture to liberalism. That is, he feels that his arguments about community 
membership and identity allow him to make substantive claims about the necessity of cultural 
membership to autonomy. “[F]or meaningful individual choice to be possible,” he states, 
“individuals need not only access to information, the capacity to reflectively evaluate it, and 
freedom of expression and association. They need access to a societal culture.” (Kymlicka, 
1997: 84). And Raz agrees, stating that culture is a precondition for, and “gives shape and 
content to, individual freedom” (Raz, 1994: 178). However, the claim that autonomy 
presupposes a framework of values, memberships, and commitments is distinct from – and 
does not justify – the subsequent claim that we need access to a ‘culture’ in order to act 
freely. Kymlicka and Raz are too hasty in making this connection, and are wrong to do so. 
 
In seeking to rebut the communitarian critique, Kymlicka and Raz incorporate too much of the 
communitarian argument into their own theories, and hence, fall into the same trap that 
communitarians and certain other theorists make about the nature of personal identity and 
freedom. Namely, they selectively elevate certain attachments and memberships as more 
ontologically and normatively significant than others. For communitarians like MacIntyre, for 
example, the context in which we locate our conception of who we are and what we want (and 
which therefore provides the background conditions for our deliberations about value) is 
ultimately derived from our membership of a particular community over and above all others, 
namely, our ‘political’ community. True, they admit that we will also be members of other, 
more specific communities and groups and associations (religious groups, for example, or 
ethnic or gender groups), but these more specific groups will “derive their moral worth from 
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the extent of their contribution to the (politically defined) common good, or, at least, their 
compatibility with it” (Badhwar, 1996: 7). As MacIntyre states, the “ordering of goods within 
the activities of individual lives . . . is found to be inseparable from the ordering of these goods 
in achieving the common good.” (MacIntyre, 1994: 288). Similarly, Sandel’s rejection of the 
procedural republic and the deontological morality of the Enlightenment in favour of a 
teleological approach draws upon Aristotle’s claims about the normative and ontological 
supremacy of citizenship as the membership capable of binding one’s other attachments 
together and providing unity to the self (Sandel, 1982). For MacIntyre and Sandel, therefore, I 
am in an important sense a citizen over and above anything else, and thus I approach (or, at 
least, I should approach) any situation or conflict or decision as a citizen. My role as a citizen 
unifies my self and, hence, it will provide the lens through which I examine not merely my 
political roles and ideals but everything else as well.  
 
But it is by no means clear why this particular membership is necessarily any more definitive 
of a person’s identity than any other. Indeed, it is not at all clear why one particular value 
need be (or should be) conceived as more important than any other or, if it is, exactly who 
decides which role or membership occupies this important role.  
 
The tendency to define certain groups and individuals by virtue of particular ‘essentialisable’ 
facts or traits about them is all too apparent in the history of politics and political thought. 
Aristotle’s claim that women and slaves were ‘naturally’ unsuited to political office is, perhaps, 
the most obvious example, but we can find it too in Plato and Nietzsche. More recently, 
however, essentialism has been widely denounced for its exclusionary implications. 
Essentialising one’s ethnicity or gender or sexuality, for example, as the most important or 
defining aspect of one’s identity has been rightly criticised for misconstruing social constructs 
and labels as natural facts about persons and hence opening the way to quite substantial 
exclusions and inequalities. The kind of argument that claims women are naturally unsuited to 
political office, for example, is cut from the same cloth as those which claim that black people 
are naturally more lazy than white people, that Jews are naturally selfish, and that gays are 
naturally promiscuous. Such arguments have always been popular among racists, anti-
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Semites, and homophobes who find it easier to justify socially-constructed inequalities in 
terms of biology or natural fate.  
 
Thus, essentialism in this biologically determinist sense has been widely (but not wholly) 
rejected in contemporary political philosophy in favour of an approach which avoids ascribing 
particular ends and interests to persons by virtue of their particular memberships or traits, and 
rightly so. But while the tendency to convert social identities into natural identities is rare, the 
strategy of selectively elevating certain social or political roles as more important – and more 
defining of one’s identity – than any other is still widespread. Indeed, it is enjoying something 
of a renaissance in contemporary political theory. Outside communitarianism the strategy of 
selective elevation finds its most obvious normative expression among the more radical 
advocates of ‘identity politics’, and in those who have sought to invoke the importance of 
nationality or culture to identity and freedom. For some radical feminists, women and men are 
conceived to be ultimately defined by their membership of their particular gender group, in the 
sense that their more specific goals and projects, and their wider understanding of who they 
are and what opportunities are open to them, are ultimately determined by their gender (or, 
more accurately, the social norms which determine the roles associated with gender). For 
feminists like Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon, and many second-wave feminists, 
the social, political, and cultural significance afforded to gender by society is so pervasive and 
inescapable that it represents the implicit structure (the ‘objective standard’) against which 
men and women come to understand their various, more personal goals and projects 
(including their membership of a particular ‘political’ community) (MacKinnon, 1987; Dworkin, 
1981).  
 
We can see the strategy of selective elevation at work in arguments advanced by other 
thinkers too. Nationalists like Yael Tamir, for example, have argued that it is one’s religious 
membership of a national community which is of supreme importance, and provides the lens 
through which one might understand one’s wider commitments and obligations (Tamir, 1993). 
Similarly other theorists and political activists have argued that it is one’s religious identity, or 
ethnicity, or race which is most significant. Culturalism is but one further example of this kind 
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of argument. Culturalist liberals like Kymlicka and Raz share the strategy of selective 
elevation, in their claim that it is a person’s membership of a particular cultural community 
which dominates their identity, which structures their more particular goals and ideals, and 
which (under conditions of discrimination and exclusion) denies them access to political 
discourse by excluding them from those resources or goods which make these discourses 
accessible to them. The culturalist argument is not that we will only be members of cultures. 
Raz in particular is attentive to the fact that we will be members of different groups at the 
same time. Rather, it is that our cultural membership, as opposed to any other, which will 
provide the overarching structure of values and ideas within which we will be able to evaluate 
and order our smaller, more localised memberships and roles. Consequently, the culturalist 
argument is not that cultural membership confers an important set of goals and 
understandings which must be evaluated in the context of others. It is rather that cultural 
membership represents the background context within which deliberations about all our other 
attachments and ideas must take place. Our culture is not subject to revision in the same way 
that our other attachments might (and should) be; rather, it provides the resources necessary 
for autonomous reflection to get off the ground. Culturalists are clear on this. Raz, for 
example, argues that membership of a cultural group “is of vital importance to individuals . . . 
one’s cultural membership determines the horizon of one’s opportunities. Of what one may 
become, or (if one is older) what one might have been.” (Raz, 1994: 177). And Kymlicka, 
states that our cultural membership provides the necessary context in which we can make 
“judgements about how to lead our lives. In this sense,” he says, “our culture not only 
provides options, but it also provides [what Ronald Dworkin calls] the ‘spectacles through 
which we identify experiences as valuable’” (Kymlicka, 1997: 8). To those who have 
suggested that in appearing to place cultural membership beyond the scope of autonomous 
reflection he is endorsing a “rather communitarian view of the self” (Kymlicka, 1995: 91), 
Kymlicka states that liberals should not in fact be concerned with trying to provide individuals 
with the resources to question the requirements of their cultural membership, but merely the 
“freedom to move around within one’s societal culture” (Kymlicka, 1995: 90, emphasis 
added). 
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When beginning from such foundations, it is not difficult to establish a link between these 
particular defining memberships and personal autonomy. If one’s identity or self-
understanding is understood to be inextricably tied to one’s religious or cultural or national 
membership, for example, it follows that one’s ability to reflect upon and interpret one’s ends, 
or to make meaningful choices about one’s life, will be undermined or thwarted in the event of 
this membership being denied, or robbed, or rendered inaccessible. Similarly, if one’s 
capacity to reason is held to be rooted in (and made possible by) one’s embeddedness in a 
particular community, attachment, or group, then it is going to be incompatible with any 
normative theory which requires that persons deliberate independently of this attachment, or 
requires that persons should be capable of evaluating the worth of this attachment itself. 
Furthermore, when beginning from such foundations, it is not difficult to argue for the special 
recognition of certain groups at the expense of others under the auspices of protecting 
individual autonomy. 
 
But neither the agent nor autonomy should be understood in this way. Persons will often find 
themselves faced with dilemmas and conflicts arising precisely out of the fact that they draw 
their identity from a multiplicity of roles and communities and memberships at any one time, 
and that often no single role or value among them holds the answer to what they should do, 
or how they should act, in response to the specific circumstances which face them. A Muslim 
or Sikh or Jew, for example, will indeed understand herself as a member of a particular 
church (or a possessor or certain religious beliefs), but she will also, at the same time, 
understand herself as a ‘mother’, a ‘daughter’, a ‘wife’, a ‘friend’, a ‘woman’, a ‘citizen’; she 
may be a member of a particular club or social group; she may have a job, or occupy some 
other office or role. Now, it is entirely possible, of course, for her to consider one of these 
roles to be more important to her than any other (depending upon her own particular view on 
this). However, to hold that one of these memberships or roles should necessarily be posited 
by philosophers as necessarily more important than any other (as the source of identity which 
people use to order their other memberships and obligations), or itself a precondition for 
autonomous reflection and choice is undermined when we realise that even in such 
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communities, persons will often find themselves forced to make decisions which cannot be 
resolved merely by an appeal to a single membership or allegiance.  
 
“Values may easily clash within the breast of a single individual . . . [and when they do] we 
must engage in what are called trade-offs - rules, values, principles must yield to each other 
to varying degrees in specific situations" (Berlin, 1997: 10 – 15). The Jehovah’s Witness who 
is faced with the decision of either allowing her son a life-saving blood transfusion or letting 
him die, for instance, is genuinely faced with a tragic and agonising choice between (at least) 
two aspects of her self. Her commitment to her religious beliefs might lead her to the 
conclusion that the ‘ingestion’ of blood is morally wrong, but she will also be a ‘parent’ who 
loves her son, who has hopes and aspirations for him, and who does not want to see him die. 
She might also be a ‘wife’ who must take into account the views and feelings of her husband, 
and so on. Similarly, a member of a strict religious community who must decide whether to 
send his child to an orthodox school which will prepare him for a life of strict religious 
observance (at the expense of providing the child with the capacity to compete for jobs and 
pursue a living of his own choice on a free and equal basis with others), or to a non-orthodox 
school which has a better reputation for its teaching in 'non-religious' subjects like 
mathematics, science, and languages, is compelled to choose between two conflicting 
accounts of what the 'best interests of his child' might be. Again, depending upon that 
individual’s grasp of his or her own beliefs and ideals these various roles might all be 
understood in terms of her membership of her religious community. The Jehovah’s Witness 
might, for example, conclude that acting ‘in her son’s best interests’ requires letting him die (if 
she understands her son’s ‘best interests’ are entirely determined within the context of the 
orthodox religious beliefs that she holds), just as the religious parent might believe that his 
child's best interests are served by sending him to a religious school, even though this might 
be at the expense of him gaining certain qualifications that he might have obtained if he had 
gone elsewhere.  
 
The point that concerns us here is not what these people should decide (or indeed, whether in 
cases such as these the choice should be left to the parents), but that the resolution of such a 
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complex moral and personal dilemma arises out of a process of deliberation which pits the 
various roles and obligations one feels at any one time against one another. Such decisions 
cannot be simply or easily resolved by an appeal to the values embodied in a single 
community because a large part of what makes the dilemma so difficult is precisely that the 
course of action mandated by one set of commitments conflicts with that mandated by 
another. The dilemmas arising out of our various memberships may not be merely ‘reasoned 
away’ or dissolved by an appeal to the over-arching values which prevail in the cultural 
community to which we belong because, often, these values will be as much in the balance 
(to be weighed against others) as any other value or obligation or commitment that we feel. 
We can choose to subordinate certain of our ends to certain others, of course, but what we 
cannot do is claim that these certain ends will be the same for all people (or all members of a 
particular group) or that these attachments lie outside the deliberative process (and thus 
unquestionable and fixed). One’s roles and obligations need not always conflict. But it is not 
difficult to imagine circumstances in which they do, and in these circumstances our dilemmas 
are not easily resolved by referring to a single set of values or beliefs which wholly define the 
solution. In such circumstances, "[w]e are doomed to choose, and every choice may entail an 
irreparable loss,” because the obligations in question cannot always be subsumed within a 
larger system of value, or be measured against a single standard” (Berlin, 1997: 11).  
 
As we have already mentioned, it is not unusual in the literature for supporters of the strategy 
of selective elevation to acknowledge the diverse and multiple roles that individuals will 
occupy at any one time. The issue is not, therefore, whether people will find themselves 
embedded in different communities, but which of these communities is conceived to be the 
most important in terms of autonomy and identity-conferral. Communitarians like MacIntyre, 
for example, do not deny that we will occupy many social roles at once, and that these social 
roles will require us to act or to think of ourselves in a certain way. However, MacIntyre 
believes that this represents a fundamental problem at the heart of the modern condition: 
modernity forces us to think of ourselves as shaped by our many different social roles without 
giving us the resources we need to bring all these roles together into a single unity, he 
argues; hence, the fact that the self is multipally embedded in different roles represents (in the 
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modern world) a constraint upon freedom, rather than a structural condition of it. The 
Enlightenment, he says, has liquidated the “self into a set of demarcated areas of role-
playing” (Macintyre, 1996: 205); the paradox at the heart of the modernity is that it presents a 
world split (or ‘compartmentalised’) into separate spheres of activity which are conceived to 
exist in isolation from one another (Macintyre, 1999: 311 – 329), while exalting a conception 
of the individual as unified and autonomous. In the absence of a political community built 
upon a shared set of constitutive values, capable of providing unity to the various roles that 
we occupy at any one time, MacIntyre argues, the modern agent must ignore or play down 
those divergences and differences that exist within it in the interests of establishing some 
sense of unity within itself. “The divided self . . . has to have developed habits of mind that 
enable it not to attend to what it would have to recognise as its own incoherences, if it were to 
understand itself apart from its involvements in each of its particular roles in each distinct 
sphere” (Macintyre, 1999: 326). Consequently, autonomy requires self-deception.   
 
This is clearly an illiberal conclusion, and is intended as such. But it is not clear why 
individuals should impose unity on themselves at the expense of acknowledging the 
complexity of their various obligations and roles and allegiances. Furthermore, as I suggested 
earlier, it need not be the case that our various roles and memberships will conflict at all. After 
all, a single individual may exhibit very different qualities and attitudes in different aspects of 
his life without rendering himself hopelessly divided or confused about his own identity or 
wider interests. He could be competitive while playing football, co-operative when sharing in 
housework, determined when pursuing his career, passive and amiable when among friends, 
and yet still be able to conceive himself as a single person or ‘self’. True, the various aspects 
of our lives often embody their own norms and assumptions and codes of conduct but 
acknowledging as much does not compel us to conceive persons as fractured or unable to 
understand their lives as anything more than a series of dislocated roles or commitments. 
Indeed, it is precisely the fact that our various roles require us to conduct ourselves differently 
at different times that their convergence can often cause such anxiety and confusion; when 
work intrudes upon the realm of the family, for example, or when stresses or worries in our 
family lives encroach upon our ability to act as we might like in our working lives, and so on, 
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we might find ourselves unsure of how to act or which norms to follow. We need not reason 
away the complexity of the relationship between our various memberships and obligations in 
order to understand ourselves as a unified agent. True, we might do so as a means of 
rendering our decisions less difficult or painful (we might choose to live our lives in denial of 
our own inconsistency on certain matters), but it would be wrong to claim that such self-
deception is required in order for us to make meaningful decisions about our lives (and in 
order for us to be held responsible for these decisions). Indeed, liberalism actually attempts to 
mitigate instances of self-deception or self-delusion by insisting that persons be given as 
much information as possible upon which to base their decisions. Autonomous choices, for 
the liberal, are necessarily choices made in the light of as much information as possible in the 
circumstances, and autonomous agency is born out of a process of deciding and acting in as 
informed a manner as possible. Contra the culturalists, liberals should be sceptical of the idea 
that the correct view on a particular course of action or set of values should be derived from a 
single set of beliefs or moral values, and should instead encourage the idea that good 
decisions might more appropriately arise from individuals being exposed to a wide range of 
perspectives and arguments that they can use to better evaluate the issue at hand. Many 
liberals have suggested that this should be an important component in a programme of liberal 
education (Gutmann, 1990; Callan, 1997; Brighouse, 2000).  
 
The general conception of autonomy that I am outlining, then, and which I suggest is more 
coherent than that advanced by culturalist liberals, is thus: when reflecting on what we should 
or should not do in certain circumstances we do not retreat into a realm of pure reason, nor 
do we necessarily consult the set of ideals and values embodied in one membership or role. 
Rather we advance into the realm of lived experience in all its complexity and diversity. By 
occupying a particular perspective (or set of perspectives) within me, I am able to grasp the 
way in which this perspective fits with the wider network of preferences and commitments 
which make me who I am, and weigh my competing interests and inclinations and duties as a 
result. It is, therefore (in an important sense), agency itself which brings together our various 
experiences. By deliberating upon the validity or significance of our particular ends and 
attachments from the perspective of those other attachments that claim us, we bring the 
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various aspects of ourselves together into a whole. By working out for myself what my various 
values and commitments and ideals mean to me (and how I should act in response to them) 
by examining them from the conjoined perspective of my other values and commitments, that 
is, the various aspects of my life are brought together through the very process of reasoning 
and acting in the world. Certain circumstances, of course, will reveal the incompatibility of my 
commitments in all their clarity and complexity. But it is in bringing these values together, in 
reconciling them as best I can in order that I might decide what to do in such circumstances, 
that they most obviously come together to form the understanding I have of the world and of 
my own interests, preferences, and ends. Far from displacing the 'unity of the self', then, the 
modern autonomy-supportive state forces us to acknowledge the complex interaction of 
ideals and values and obligations which occurs within us (by providing us with the resources, 
and the requisite ‘space’ in which to explore these values and obligations for ourselves), to 
recognise the important demands that these (impersonal and personal) claims make of us, 
and to bring these competing aspects of our lives together in such a way that their 
convergence can provide a basis for meaningful decision and action in the world. By 
examining a particular ideal or belief or course of action from the perspective of my other 
values and beliefs and ideals, that is, I am able to decide on the validity or significance of 
these beliefs and values for myself, not from a separate and dislocated plateau of pure 
reason, or from the perspective of one particular membership over all those others which 
influence me, but from the perspective of those many commitments and perspectives which 
shape my deliberations and make me who I am. 
 
2.  Liberalism, Deliberation, and the Politics of Multiple-Embeddedness. 
 
What, then, are the normative implications of the strategy of selective elevation? In particular, 
what are the implications of its rejection for liberal political theory? Returning to the 
characterisation of the strategy of selective elevation presented in section 1, it is clear that it 
supports widely differing normative ends, depending on which membership is held to be most 
significant. Communitarians like Sandel and MacIntyre conceive our various allegiances to be 
understood through the lens of the shared values embodied in our political community, hence, 
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they argue that the principal function of politics is to reveal what these values are, so that they 
might inform an appropriate set of policies for that community. Those who emphasise gender 
have often argued that politics should be ‘gendered’ in a way that foregrounds thisaspect of 
our identity (Hekman, 1999; Gilligan, 1982; Young, 1990; Young, 1997). Those who argue for 
the supremacy of national identity tend to argue for the political recognition of nationality; 
those who emphasise religious membership tend to argue for special rights or provisions for 
religious groups, and so on.  
 
The liberal culturalist variant of this argument has primarily been used to defend the 
politicisation of cultural groups via the allocation of group-specific rights or provisions. At the 
level of public policy, this approach has often been used to justify the exemption of certain 
groups from pre-existing laws. Examples of such exemptions are common and widespread in 
the literature and include the exemption of Muslims and Jews from laws governing the 
humane slaughter of animals for meat, the exemption of Sikhs from laws requiring the 
wearing of motorcycle helmets, and the exemption of members of the gypsy community from 
laws governing the amount of time children must spend at school per year (Barry, 2001: 32 – 
62; Parekh, 1990; Poulter, 1998). At the deeper normative level, the argument for 
politicisation has been employed by culturalists against what Brian Barry has called the liberal 
‘strategy of privatization’, and against political liberalism in particular (Barry, 2001: 19 – 54). 
This strategy describes the approach that we find most obviously in the work of liberals like 
John Rawls and Charles Larmore, who argue that the cultural, religious, and other values 
which people hold should be considered private, in the sense that their truth should not 
directly inform principles of political association or public policy (or the mechanisms by which 
policies and principles are decided). Political liberalism therefore builds upon an important 
tradition in liberalism which suggests that principles, institutions, and policies which claim their 
legitimacy in the truth of a particular comprehensive doctrine will often lead to conflict in 
societies which are divided on precisely these questions of truth and value. It is therefore a 
practical and philosophical response to cultural diversity: the ends and obligations embodied 
in the various roles we occupy at any one time may well be important in the conferral of 
identity, but they cannot provide a foundation for the legitimacy of social and political 
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institutions in liberal democratic states because the truth of these values will be quite 
reasonably rejected by others for whom the source of truth lies elsewhere. Political liberals 
like Rawls and Larmore therefore suggest that in the interests of deriving regulative principles 
of political association and, hence, legitimate public institutions, individuals ought to reason in 
ways which do not appeal to the truth of their own comprehensive doctrines or the falsity of 
others’ but the value of broader principles upon which diverse people can agree despite their 
deeper disagreements about the good (Rawls, 1983; Larmore, 1996; Moon, 1993). 
 
There is a two-fold assumption at the heart of political liberalism, then: (a) that the legitimacy 
of political principles and institutions cannot be provided by the truth of ethical or moral 
values, including liberal values like individual autonomy, but rather through agreements made 
by differently situated individuals, and (b) that these differently situated individuals will be 
capable of reasoning with others without appealing to the truth of the values or commitments 
embodied in those various memberships which shape their identities. 
 
These two assumptions have come under intense criticism from non-liberals and liberals 
alike. Assumption (a) has been criticised by those liberals who believe that liberalism is 
necessarily a comprehensive doctrine, and that liberal institutions should be concerned 
primarily with encouraging substantive goods like individual autonomy or well-being (for 
example, Gutmann, 1999; Wall, 1998). In particular, some critics suggest that the 
commitment to ‘political autonomy’ that we find in Rawlsian political liberalism requires that 
persons conceive themselves as autonomous more generally, and that, therefore, political 
liberalism collapses into comprehensive liberalism. Assumption (b) has been criticised by 
liberals and non-liberals who believe that the requirement that persons do not appeal to the 
truth of their cultural or religious commitments in political debates is too strong, and that many 
people will not be able to do this (for example, Gray, 1995; Young, 1990).  
 
Raz and Kymlicka criticise both assumptions. Both conceive liberalism to be a comprehensive 
doctrine rooted in the value of individual autonomy, and both reject the form of political 
reasoning at the heart of political liberalism as unrealistic. Kymlicka’s claim, as we mentioned 
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earlier, is that political liberalism is too demanding of citizens because it requires that they 
deliberate differently in ‘public’ life to ‘private’ life. This, he says, requires persons to adopt a 
schizophrenic understanding of themselves as one kind of person in public and another in 
private. The political liberal approach therefore embodies obvious problems for the 
culturalists. If one were to hold that an individual’s capacity to reason about their life was 
made possible by their membership of one attachment or group identity over all others, as 
Raz and Kymlicka do, it follows that one would have to reject any approach to politics which 
required that individuals reason in ways which do not appeal to the values embodied in that 
group at any time. Such an approach would require persons to reason in ways that are not 
possible. 
 
However, if we acknowledge that persons do not necessarily reason in this way (as we did in 
section 1), and that the background context against which they evaluate the content of their 
lives (and everything else) is provided by their membership of many and different 
communities at once, the political liberal approach seems less controversial, and the 
requirements it makes of individual citizens seem less demanding. The rejection of the 
strategy of selective elevation that we find in the culturalist liberalism of Raz and Kymlicka 
suggests that persons will inevitably reason from different perspectives and in different ways 
in different circumstances, and hence, will often understand themselves differently in different 
circumstances. It is precisely the fact that we do not draw our view of the world from a single 
attachment or membership that enables us to reason from different perspectives as 
appropriate. We will not resolve disputes among family members in the same way that we 
resolve disputes between work colleagues, for example. We will invoke different rules and we 
will think and act and justify our actions differently. Among family members we will invoke 
sentiments and sympathies which have no place or relevance in business meetings. Among 
friends we will resolve conflicts by appeals to bonds of loyalty and trust which do not apply in 
the same way among people with whom we are differently associated. The fact that we are 
differently constituted therefore allows us to use those methods of reasoning which are 
appropriate to the situation at hand. The consequence of MacIntyre’s suggestion that we 
derive our identity from our political community above any other, or Kymlicka’s claim that it is 
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our cultural group which determines my ideas about value, is, as we have already suggested, 
that we must necessarily reason in all circumstances in the same way. We must view all our 
relationships and resolve all our conflicts through the lens of the political community 
(MacIntyre) or our cultural group (Kymlicka). We must always resolve conflicts, and always 
make decisions, as a citizen of a particular community, or a member of a particular culture. If 
conflicts between values or courses of action occur, the argument goes, we resolve them by 
consulting the values embodied in that one membership which provides the background 
context for our reasoning about value. However, if we subscribe to a liberalism which 
acknowledges our multiple-embeddedness and which does not seek to arbitrarily elevate one 
of our attachments above all others as necessarily most defining of our identity, then we need 
do no such thing. The critique of the selective elevation if value (and liberal culturalism in 
particular) captures something important about persons, namely, that they will not always 
reason in the same way, but will instead reason differently depending on who they are talking 
to and what outcomes they desire.  
 
What the rejection of the strategy of elevation makes possible, then, is a conception of 
liberalism which occupies a middle-ground between communitarianism on the one hand and 
political liberalism on the other through its commitment to the comprehensive value of 
autonomy (appropriately conceived). Communitarians argue that we are defined primarily by 
our political community (and hence, by those ideals and commitments which arise out of 
political deliberations with others). Consequently, they argue, our political community 
necessarily shapes our understanding of those other, more personal, attachments which 
constitute our identity. Political liberals argue the opposite: they claim that we are able to 
engage in the appropriate form of public reasoning about justice and politics regardless of 
what we believe and feel in other aspects of our lives, and regardless of the constraints 
placed upon us in these other, more personal, commitments and memberships. For the 
political liberal, reasoning about politics in the appropriate way is possible and necessary 
regardless of whether we value autonomy in our lives more widely. 
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There are significant problems with both of these positions. The communitarian claim that we 
are (and should be) primarily shaped by our political community over and above all others 
seems arbitrary for all the reasons we have thus far outlined. Meanwhile, the political liberal 
commitment to the principle of autonomy in the political realm but not on the private realm is 
problematic. The idea that individuals can be autonomous in public while at the same time 
suffering under conditions of oppression and hardship in private is difficult to maintain. The 
conditions that prevail in one’s private life (that is, in the realm of the family, faith and other 
personal relationships) deeply effect the kind of life one is able to lead (and, importantly, 
conceive for oneself) in public. Feminists have pointed this out most forcefully, but they are 
not alone in doing so. The argument presented herein hopes to make possible a conception 
of liberalism which retains the political liberal aim of establishing legitimate political institutions  
in circumstances of diversity by appealing to a conception of autonomy which is consistent 
with this aim, which takes the multiple and overlapping memberships of individuals seriously, 
and acknowledges the necessarily comprehensive nature of this ideal. In rejecting the 
selective elevation of value, the argument herein recognises that persons will (and should) 
reason differently in different circumstances but that these deliberations presuppose and 
require the agent to be autonomous in the sense that they are able to genuinely reflect upon 
their various ends and attachments, and to explain and justify their position in a way 
appropriate to the circumstances. Whether they are reflecting upon their religious beliefs, their 
ascribed social roles, their career choice, their responsibilities as a father or friend, or the 
rightful character of the state, persons will need to be able to examine the content of their 
lives in the light of their various other attachments and the attachments and concerns of 
others. And they will do so as multipally embedded, autonomous individuals who are made 
autonomous by the occupation of different memberships and roles which are capable of 
providing the requisite perspectives on the range of choices and courses of action they face, 
as appropriate. 
 
The rejection of the selective elevation of value therefore goes some way in resolving the 
philosophical tensions between those liberals who argue for the ‘strategy of privatization’ and 
those liberals and non-liberals who believe that cultural and other identity-conferring groups 
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should be politicised. It supports a conception of liberalism which is ‘political’ in the sense that 
the rules which legitimate and regulate the structure and conduct of public institutions are 
rightfully derived from the collective public deliberations of all persons who are to be governed 
by them, but is ‘comprehensive’ in the sense that it acknowledges the need for the 
deliberative process by which individual agents decide on the rightful character of the state to 
be conceived to be circumscribed by certain substantive commitments (for example, to 
individual autonomy). The account of autonomy outlined above effectively theorises a basic 
assumption of political liberalism (that persons will be able to deliberate differently in different 
contexts, and therefore as a citizen when the circumstances demand), and suggests a way in 
which political liberals like Rawls and Larmore can retain their commitment to public 
deliberation about regulative principles of justice in a way that is compatible with a more 
comprehensive commitment to individual autonomy.  
 
The strength of this account, therefore, is that (a) it provides a way out for political liberals 
who have in the past seemed trapped by their own implicit support for autonomy, and (b) it 
underwrites (and makes plausible) the traditional liberal strategy of securing a basic set of 
civil, political, and economic rights for all individual persons without the need of (or justification 
for) the allocation of group specific rights for cultures. Once we understand that culture is not 
necessarily more important to individual identity and autonomy than any other membership 
that the individual holds, the principal argument in favour of politicising cultural groups through 
the allocation of group specific rights loses much of its force. And as soon as we understand 
that political liberalism can appeal to an appropriately conceived idea of individual autonomy 
without forsaking its central commitment to establishing a set of rules of political association 
through the collective deliberation of those persons who are to be bound by them, then we 
can better understand an appropriate liberal response to issues concerning the clash between 
civil rights and cultural practices which should be supported by political and comprehensive 
liberals alike. 
 
Broadly conceived, the response underwritten by the rejection of the strategy of selective 
elevation is to embrace the traditional liberal commitment to the strategy of privatization, and 
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to secure those basic civil rights for all that persons will need in order to decide for 
themselves as to the worth of the particular memberships and commitments they hold and 
which shape their wider life-goals. One’s ‘political’ identity can and should be considered 
distinct from the various other identities which shape one’s wider ideas about the world, but 
only in the same way that one’s religion or ethnicity or gender should be considered distinct. It 
is distinct from, and not independent of, other sources of identity. A liberal political community 
does not represent a stand-alone community in which individuals must deliberate as if they 
were unencumbered selves (Sandel) or mere ‘ciphers’ (Gray), it is rather a community in 
which, under the right conditions, persons will be capable of deliberating as a citizen against 
the background of their other, wider memberships and attachments. Their understanding of 
what it means to be a citizen may well be influenced by the ideas embodied in their other 
memberships, but it does not follow from this that persons cannot think of themselves in the 
appropriate way at the appropriate time when considering a particular range of questions. 
 
Kymlicka is therefore right that liberalism cannot accede to the demands of cultural groups 
who wish to impose the kind of ‘internal restrictions’ on their members that would undermine 
their ability to evaluate the worth of their particular allegiances and to exercise their rights. 
This may have implications, for example, for the kind of education that minority groups must 
provide their children, and the kind of practices in which groups can engage in the name of 
their cultural values. It might also undermine the case for the kind of group-specific legal 
exemptions that we mentioned earlier. The precise policy implications of this argument will 
rightly emerge out of the public deliberations of those involved, under conditions specified by 
liberal principles, and will depend upon the empirical circumstances at hand. The role of 
liberal theory is to fix the conditions under which more specific deliberations about policies 
and institutions might be had, and decisions about policy might be made.  
 
But Kymlicka is wrong to argue that the protection of individuals from internal restrictions on 
the free exercise of their civil rights requires the politicisation of group identities or the 
complete rejection of political liberalism. Individual autonomy can only be realised under 
legitimate social and political institutions which seek to provide the basic rights and freedoms 
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necessary for persons to understand themselves as free and equal citizens of a political 
community. And autonomy makes possible the forms of public deliberation capable of 
affording genuine legitimacy to institutions under circumstances of diversity. The 
responsibilities of the liberal state do not begin and end with securing autonomy. They must 
provide the appropriate conditions under which individuals might reason productively with one 
another about the rightful ends of the state and – in cases when autonomy clashes with other 
values – what should be decided. Political liberalism therefore needs to appeal to the value of 
individual autonomy as it is the value that makes liberal public reason possible, but it should 
appeal to a conception of autonomy of the kind outlined herein; one which embraces rather 
than denies the complex, diverse attachments that individuals will hold at any one time, and 
which provides the conditions under which debates as to the legitimacy of institutions and 
policies might be meaningfully had. 
 
3.  Conclusion. 
 
In this article, I have sought to challenge the growing tendency among certain liberal thinkers 
to politicise cultural identity claims and groups on the grounds that culture provides the 
necessary background conditions for autonomy. I have done so by suggesting that the claim 
that our culture provides the background conditions for autonomy rests upon the strategy of 
selectively and arbitrarily elevating a single aspect of one’s identity as normatively and 
ontologically more significant than any other in a way that cannot be sustained and which 
should be replaced with an alternative conception which is more attentive to the complexity of 
human identity and experience. Having argued as much, I have suggested that this 
alternative conception of autonomy is largely consistent with the political liberal aim of 
establishing the legitimacy of social and political institutions under circumstances of diversity, 
and effectively theorises a basic and necessary (and often criticised) assumption made by 
political liberals in a way that renders it consistent with comprehensive liberalism. The 
capacity of individuals to engage in the appropriate form of reasoning as to their ends and 
attachments is an important value in liberalism, and it is necessarily comprehensive in nature. 
This provides a guide to the development of public policy and the actions of state institutions. 
 22 
But the way in which persons deliberate in different aspects of their lives will be different, and 
the reasons they find compelling or reasonable or ridiculous will differ depending upon the 
circumstances in which they find themselves, the people they are talking to, and the other 
considerations they believe to be relevant at any one time. Consequently, I suggest that 
liberalism should not seek to politicise cultural groups, because the principal liberal argument 
in favour of doing so (i.e. that it is necessary for autonomy) is false, and that realising this 
allows one to better grasp the strengths and weaknesses of political liberalism by more 
adequately theorising the assumptions embodied within it. 
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